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ERISA: ENFORCING ORAL PROMISES TO PAY
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS
Pension plans represent an increasingly important and powerful accumulation of
wealth in the United States. In 1950, employer-established private pension plans in the
United States held, in the aggregate, 12.1 billion dollars.' By 1970 that amount increased
to 137.1 billion dollars.2 Currently, more than 350 billion dollars' in employee benefit
fund assets exist to provide some form of pension to more than half of all employees.'
This phenomenal growth in pension plans is attributable to a combination of factors,
including favorable tax treatment of employer contributions, employer attempts to in-
crease employee productivity and attract and retain personnel, and union demands.' As
the importance of private pension plans grows, however, so do the problems of protecting
the rights of employees under those plans."
In 1974, Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"
or the "Act"), 7 a comprehensive federal statute, to regulate privately established employee
benefit plans. 8 Congress designed ERISA to protect plan participants and beneficiaries 9
from such unfair practices by employers as unconscionable forfeiture provisions and the
I E. ALLEN, J. MELONE, & J. ROSENBLOOM, PENSION PLANNING 3 (4th ed. 1981) (Table 1-1)
[hereinafter PENSION PLANNING].
2 Id.
3 Id. at 2.
Feldstein, Private Pensions as Corporate Debt, in THE CHANGING ROLES OF DEBT AND EQUITY IN
FINANCING U.S. CAPITAL FORMATION 75 (B. Friedman ed. 1982).
'See PENSION PLANNING, supra note 1, at 7-14; D. MCGILL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE PENSIONS
21-28 (4th ed. 1979) [hereinafter McGill.).
" Snyder, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 11 WAKE FOREST L. RF.V, 219, 223
(1975).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982). The Act is divided into four Titles. Title I provides for the
protection of employee rights through, among other things, increased reporting and disclosure and
the imposition of fiduciary duties on plan trustees. Id. §§ 1001-1145. Title II contains primarily
the Internal Revenue Code tax provisions regarding pension plans. I.R.C. §§ 401-419A (1982 &
Supp. LII 1985). Title III contains formal provisions for compliance with Titles I and 2.29 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-42. Title IV establishes a program of plan termination compliance. Id. §§ 1301-1461.
ERISA empowers the United States Department of Labor to promulgate regulations to carry
out the provisions of Title I (reporting and disclosure) and Title IV (regulation of plan termination
insurance provided by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation). Id. § 1135. Similarly, the United
States Treasury Department promulgates regulations under the Internal Revenue Code provisions
governing the qualification of employee benefit plans for favorable tax treatment. Id. § 1202. Section
3004 of Title III of ERISA provides for the coordination between the Department of the Treasury
and the Department of Labor where provisions relating to the same subject overlap. Id. § 1204.
For an excellent general discussion of the provisions of.ER1SA's various Titles see MCGILL,
supra note 5, at 37-40.
8 29	 § 1001(6). The Act is comprehensive in that it occupies the entire field of pension
plan regulation. Lieben, The Coverage of Title I of ERISA: Some Recent Developments, 61 NEIL L. REV.
428,429 (1982). ERISA pre-empts all state law regulation of employee benefit plans covered under
the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
9 A plan participant is any employee or former employee who is eligible to receive a benefit,
or whose beneficiaries are eligible to receive a benefit, from an ERISA plan. Id. § 1002(7). A plan
beneficiary is any person designated by a plan participant who is or may be entitled to a benefit
from an ERISA plan. Id. § 1002(8).
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misuse of plan assets.'° To this end, ERISA provides, among other things, broad coverage
requirements," minimum vesting standards' 2
 and fiduciary responsibilities for those
persons who deal with the plan or plan assets on any discretionary basis."
The Act's coverage provisions apply broadly to all "employee benefit plans" estab-
lished or maintained by an employer." ERISA defines employee benefit plans to include
both welfare benefit plans and employee pension benefit plans. 15 Welfare benefit plans
I° H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. 5-13 (1973) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. See Note,
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: Policies and Problems, '16 SYRACUSE L. REV. 539,
546-49 (1975).
" 29 U.S.C. § 1003, The coverage provisions of ERISA are contained in section 4 of Title I of
the Act and include all employee benefit plans unless specifically exempt. Id. See infra note 14 for
the relevant statutory language of section 4.
32
 29 U.S.C. § 1053. "Vesting" refers to the portion of the employee's benefit which is nonfor-
feitable and cannot be revoked by the employer, even at termination of employment. House REPORT,
supra note 10, at 5-6. Each pension plan must contain a vesting schedule under which the nonfor-
feitable portion of an employee's benefit is determined. 29 U.S.C. § 1053. A participant's benefit
must vest within specified periods under both ERISA, id., and the Internal Revenue Code, 1.R.C.
§ 411. See also McGii,L, supra note 5, at 135L47. Before ERISA, employers were not required to
vest an employee's benefit before retirement. McGita., supra note 5, at 139. This meant that if the
employee terminated employment even one day before he or she could retire the employee could
lose all of his or her benefits, even if he or she had worked for the same employer his or her entire
working life. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 6. The Committee on Education and Labor stated
"the issue basically resolves itself into whether workers, after many years of labor, whose jobs
terminate voluntarily or otherwise, should be denied benefits that have been placed for them in a
fund for retirement purposes." Id, For current provisions related to ERISA minimum vesting
standards, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061.
15
 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114; Goodman & Stone, Exempt Compensation Arrangements Under ERISA,
28 CATH. U.L. REV. 445, 445 (1979). Generally, ERISA imposes fiduciary duties on any person who
exercises any discretionary authority, responsibility or control over the management or administra-
tion of the plan or exercises any authbrity or control over plan assets, including the rendering of
investment advice for a fee. MCGILL, supra note 5, at 49. Thus, under this definition an employer,
directors or officers of the plan sponstir, members of the plan investment committee or investment
advisors are fiduciaries. Id.
" 29 U.S.C. § 1003. The Act's coverage provisions state, in pertinent part:
[E]xcept as [otherwise] provided ... Mitle [I of ERISA] ... shall apply to any em-
ployee benefit plan if it is established or maintained ... by any employer engaged in
commerce or by any employee organization ... or organizations representing
employees engaged in commerce ... or by both.
Id. The coverage provisions of ERISA specifically exclude: governmental plans (plans established
or maintained by the governement of ;the United States or any municipality); church plans (plans
established by a church exempt from taxation under Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)); plans
maintained solely for the purpose of complying with the workers' compensation laws; plans main-
tained outside the United States for nonresident aliens; and unfunded excess benefit plans (plans
maintained for management employees which exceed limits allowed under the Internal Revenue
Code § 401(a) and which are paid out of the employer's general corporate assets). Id. § 1103(b).
Labor Regulation 2510.3-2, issued pursuant to section 505 of ERISA, also excludes from Section
3(2) any severance pay plan that is unrelated to retirement, does not exceed twice the employee's
annual compensation, and is paid out within a specified period following employment. 29 C.E.R.
§ 2510.3-2(c), (d) (1975). Also excluded from ERISA are certain bonus programs and Individual
Retirement Accounts. Id.
15 Id. § 1002(3). Section 3(3) of the Act defines an "employee benefit plan" as an "employee
welfare benefit plan or an employee pension benefit plan or a plan which is both an employee
welfare benefit plan and an employee pension benefit plan." Id.
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provide, for example, medical, disability or severance pay benefits.' 6 Employee pension
benefit plans, in contrast, provide retirement or other income benefits deferred beyond
termination of employment." Neither of these statutory definitions explicitly require
that a plan be in writing to be subject to ERISA.
Although ERISA's coverage provisions do not require that a plan be in writing,
section 402 of the Act, included in the section governing the duties of plan fiduciaries,
states that every employee benefit plan must be established "pursuant to a written
instrument."Is Because the fiduciary provisions require a writing, and the general defi-
nition of an employee benefit plan contains no such requirement, it is unclear from the
statutory provisions whether the lack of a writing precludes the enforcement of a plan
under ERISA. At least one court has interpreted section 402's writing requirement to
' 6 29 U.S.G. § 1002(1). The Act defines a welfare benefit plan as:
fAiny phut, fund, or program which was heretofore or hereafter established or main-
tained by an employer or employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such
plan, fund, or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing
for its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or oth-
erwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of
sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits, apprentice-
ship or other training programs, or day care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid
legal services, or (B) any benefit described in 'section 302(c) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 19471 (other than penSions on retirement or death, and insurance to
provide such pensions).
Id.
I' 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2). The Act defines a pension plan as:
[A]ny plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or
maintained by any employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent
that by its express terms or as the result of surrounding circumstances such plan,
fund, or program —
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral or income by employees for periods extending to the termi-
nation of employment or beyond, regardless of the method of calculating the contri-
butions made to the plan, the method of calculating the benefits under the plan or-
the method ()I' distributing benefits from the plan.
1002(2)(A).
sw 29 U.S.C. § I102(a)(1). Section 402 states, in pertinent part:
[E]very employee benefit plan shall be established and maintained pursuant to a written
instrument. Such instrument shall provide For one or more timed fiduciaries, who
jointly or severally shall have authority to control and manage the operation and
administration of the plan.
Id. One commentator has called ERISA "a statutory affirmation of the proposition that employee
rights are governed solely by the terms of the plan." Wieck, Pension Refitrto Act of 1974: An Alternative
to Contractual Theories of Preserving Retirement Benefits, 14 J. FAM. L. 97, 102 (1975) [hereinafter
Wieck, An Alternative].
The Internal Revenue Service also requires that employee benefit plans be written. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.101-1(a)(2) (195(i). The Internal Revenue Code provides that contributions made to pension
plans that comply with section 401(a) of the Code are tax deductible to the employer in the year
of contribution and do not constitute income to the employee until actual receipt. I.R.C. § 404(a)
(1982 & Supp. III 1985). See also PENSION PLANNING, Aupra not 1, at 9-10. A plan that ['ails to meet
the writing requirement and thus does not obtain favorable tax treatment is still subject to all the
requirements of Title 1 of ERISA, such as tninimutn vesting, minimum funding standards, reporting
and disclosure and fiduciary standards. See Note, Private Enforcement of Employees Retirement Income
Security Act, 47 U. CiN, L. REV. 272,275 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Primate Enforcement].
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preclude enforcement of oral agreements under ERISA. 19 This court reasoned that the
writing requirement is a prerequisite to enforcement under the Act. 2° Several other
federal courts, however, have held that an employee benefit plan is enforceable notwith-
standing the lack of a written instrument. 2 ' These courts reasoned that an employer's
failure to adopt a written plan constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, but
it does not preclude enforcement of the plan's benefit provisions. 22 Furthermore, these
courts concluded that an oral promise establishes an ERISA plan if' a reasonable person
could identify the plan benefits, the beneficiaries, the source of funding and the benefit
claims procedures. 23
This note discusses the courts' conflicting interpretations of ERISA's writing require-
ment and evaluates the enforceability of oral promises to pay welfare or retirement
benefits under ERISA. 24 Part I of this note reviews the development of ERISA, including
the historical background against which Congress designed the Act 25
 and the statutory
provisions pertinent to ERISA's writing requirement. 25 Part I also examines how courts
have interpreted these provisions. 27 Part II analyzes whether oral promises to pay welfare
or retirement benefits are enforceable under ERISA and concludes that such promises
are enforceable. 28 Finally, this note discusses the appropriate standard to apply in order
to determine whether an oral agreement establishes an ERISA plan, especially in light
of the policy problems and implications of enforcing oral promises to pay benefits. This
note proposes a stricter standard, which incorporates the concept of justifiable reliance
Nachwalter v. Christie, 611 F. Supp. 655, 661-62 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 805 F.2d 956, 960
(11th Cir. 1986).
"Id.
21 See, e.g.. Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., 765 F.2d 320, 324-25 (2d Cir. 1985) (employee manual
that referenced severance policy found to he an ERISA plan even though employer never executed
a plan document nor complied with ERISA, aff'd mern., 106 S. Ct. 3267 (1986); Scott v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 754 F.2d 1499, 1503-04 (9th Cir. 1985) (severance pay practice may constitute an ERISA
plan); Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372-73 (11 th Cir. 1982) (insurance provided by the
purchase of policies through a multiple-employer insurance trust found to be an ERISA plan even
though the employer did not adopt a formal written document); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Smith,
630 F. Supp. 262, 264 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (severance pay practice found not to be an ERISA plan
where plaintiff offered "office scuttlebut" as evidence to support his claim that unwritten plan
existed).
22 See, e.g., Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1372. The court stated "Where is no requirement of a formal
written plan in either ERISA's coverage section or its definition section. Once it is determined that
ERISA covers a plan, the Act's fiduciary and reporting provisions do require the plan to be
established pursuant to a written instrument." Id.
Id.
21 Benefits not covered by ERISA are enforceable under state law. See, e.g., Jervis v. Elerding,
504 F. Supp. 606, 609 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (personal service contract containing retirement benefits
not an ERISA plan and therefore enforceable in a state law contract action). This Note does not
discuss the treatment of benefits not covered by ERISA.
29 See infra notes 30-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of the historical background
of ERISA.
26 See infra notes 60-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory provisions
pertinent to ERISA's writing requirement.
27 Sec infra notes 98-160 and accompanying text for a discussion of the judicial interpretation
of the ERISA writing requirement.
2" See infra notes 161-85 and accompanying text for an assessment of the enforceability of oral
agreements under ERISA.
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into the standard courts currently employ when assessing an employer's oral promise to
pay employee benefits."
1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW
A. Employee Benefit Regulation Before ERISA
Prior to ERISA's enactment, attempts to protect an individual participant's rights to
employee benefits generally were ineffective." For the most part, benefit regulatiOn was
largely a matter of non-uniform state law." Although the Internal Revenue Code pro-
vided some protection through its requirement that employers meet certain standards
to qualify for favorable tax treatment, this protection was insufficient because it. failed
to provide employees a private right of action to enforce their right to benefits. 52 Fur-
thermore, despite the 1958 enactment of the Welfare Pension Plan Disclosure Act," a
federal statute that mandated increased reporting and disclosure to beneficiaries about
plan procedures and benefits, employees' ability to enforce those rights remained min-
imal." Thus, it was not until Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 that a comprehensive
scheme setting forth protection for participants and beneficiaries was established. 35
Prior to the enactment of federal legislation regulating benefits plans, the only
recourse available to employees who wrongfully had been denied benefits was to sue
under state law." This avenue of recovery, however, did not afford the employee effec-
tive protection, because the majority of courts traditionally viewed such benefits as "mere
'" See infra notes 186-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems of enforcing
oral agreements under ERISA, and a suggested solution that would require, among other things,
that the plaintiff show detrimental reliance on the employer's alleged promise.
3" House REPORT, supra note 10 at 3. The House committee reported that until ERISA was
enacted, "regulation of the private system's scope and operation ha[d] been minimal and its effec-
tiveness a matter of debate." Id.
5L See Note, Pension Plans and the Rights of the Retired Worker, 70 CoLum. L. REV, 909, 916-22
(1970) [hereinafter Note, Rights of the Retired Worker]. Although all states eventually rejected the
theory that benefits were mere gratuities given by the employers, the contract theories that the
states adopted were inconsistent. Wieck, An Alternative, supra note 18, at 103-04. The majority of
courts viewed the pension plan as a contract but avoided defining the relationship or the parties.
Id. The courts that did attempt to define the relationship reached differing results. Id. at 104. Some
courts concluded that the plan was a contract with a condition subsequent while other courts viewed
the plan as a contract with a condition precedent. Id. at 105-06. Contracts most commonly were
described, however, as unilateral contracts that the employee accepted by completing service with
the employer. Id. at 106.
52 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
" Welfare & Pension Plan Disclosure Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997 (1958) (29
U.S.C. §§ 301-309 (1976)) repealed by Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1031 (1982); see Hahn, Federal Remedies for Pension Benefit Losses, 47 UMKC L. REV, 321, 323-24
(1979).
'See Hahn, supra note 33, at 323-24. Hahn notes that Congress eventually viewed the WPPDA
as piecemeal legislation that failed to meet its goals of inducing self-policing by administrators.
55 See Note, Private Enforcement, supra note 18, at 274-75.
'' Note, Rights of the Retired Worker, supra note 31, at 924. See id. at 916-22, for a discussion of
the various contract theories on which benefit recovery was based before Congress enacted ERISA.
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gratuities" which the employer could grant and withdraw freely." Although courts
gradually began to apply common law contract theories in employee benefits cases, this
approach did not protect employees because the employees frequently lacked necessary
information about their benefits." Thus, suits under state law were ineffective in pro-
tecting an employee's benefit rights."
The Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") afforded some limited safeguards to plan
beneficiaries, however, by only granting favorable tax treatment to contributions made
to qualified plans that complied with section 401 of the Code, 4° Section 901 required
that the plan be maintained pursuant to a formal trust or other binding agreement for
the exclusive benefit of participants and beneficiaries:" The employer whose plan failed
to qualify under section 401 lost favorable tax treatment for plan contributions:12 Fur-
thermore, the mishandling of plan funds resulted in possible tax penalties to the em-
ployer." The Code did not provide, however, for a private right of action to enforce its
provisions." Thus, employees could not enforce their rights to benefits on the basis of
the Internal Revenue Code.
By 1958, Congress determined that mandating the disclosure of plan information
to employees could provide the needed protection of employees' benefit rights.45 Ac-
cordingly, Congress enacted the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act ("WPPDA" ).1 6
To protect the interests of plan participants, the WPPDA required that employers report
financial and other information about their employee benefit plans to the plans' partic-
ipants and beneficiaries."' Specifically, the WPPDA required the employer to make avail-
able a description of the benefit plan and publish an annual report disclosing the plan's
37 Id. at 916; Hickey, The Establishment and Administration of Pension Plans in the Labor Relations
Process, 18 VAND. L. Rev. 151, 153-54 (1964). According to Hickey, courts viewed pension plans
generally in one of four ways: "a gratuity; a unilateral contract; a deferred wage or a charitable
contribution." Id. at 153. Under the gratuity theory, the employees had no vested rights in their
benefits until payments began. Id. Courts disliked denying pensions to employees who relied on
employers' promises and enforced the promises on grounds of estoppel. Id. at 154.
Under the unilateral contract theory, in contrast, employers offered the employee a pension
which the employee generally accepted by performing a specified number of years of service. Id.
Because the employer established his or her plan to encourage the employee's longevity of service,
an employee who left voluntarily without completing the required number of years would receive
no benefit. Id. at 154-55.
Similarly, an employer who unilaterally promised a pension may have been held liable under
the "deferred wage theory." Id. at 155. The employee accepted the employer's unilateral offer by
performing daily work. Id. Thus, the courts viewed the pension as the employees withheld earnings,
to be paid when the employee retired. Id. at 155-59.
Finally, some courts characterized the pension plans as charitable trusts. Id. at 159. The rationale
for this position may have stemmed from, among other things, the fear that trusts created under
the plans otherwise would be invalid under the Rule Against Perpetuities. Id. at 160.
38 See Note, Rights of the Retired Worker, supra note 31, at 916-22.
39 See Wieck, An Alternative, supra note 18, at 101.
House. REroter, supra note 10 at 4. A plan is "qualified" because it receives favorable tax
treatment under the Code.
1 ' I.R.C. § 401(a).
42 Note, Private. Enforcement, supra note 18, at 275.
45 1d. at 274.
" Id. at 275.
45
 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
46 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-09 (1976). See also Hickey, supra note 37, at 175.
47 Id. §§ 305-07.
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assets and liabilities and the benefits conferred to - plan beneficiaries." in addition, in its
definition of a benefit plan, the WPPDA required that the benefit program be in writing."
In sum, Congress enacted the WPPDA in the belief that employees who received
sufficient information about their employee benefits could enforce their rights under
the plan." In actual operation, however, the WPPDA proved wholly inadequate to protect
plan participants' rights." The WPPDA's disclosure requirements were weak and the
statute did not establish a standard of conduct for persons dealing with benefit plans on
a discretionary basis. 52 Congress formally repealed the WPPDA in 1974 when it. enacted
ERISA. 55
The legislative history of ERISA begins nearly a decade before its enactment. In
1961, President Kennedy commissioned the Cabinet Committee on Corporate Pension
Funds to investigate and recommend legislative changes in the structure and operation
of the private pension system." In fashioning ERISA, Congress was concerned princi-
pally with protecting an employee's expectation of receiving retirement income alter
many years of work." Employers too frequently had frustrated this expectation by acting
4"Id. §§ 304-07. Section 307 of the WPPDA .provided for the publication and distribution of
a description of the plan and the plan's annual report to the government and to the plan's
participants. Id. Penalties for failure to comply with these requirements were limited only to fines,
id. § 308(a), and injunctive relief, id. 308(f), without addressing the problem of participants who
lost benefits due to a failure to comply. Id.
49 1d. § 302(a)(1).
5" HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
Id. As pointed out in Hahn, supra note 33, at 323, employers were not willing to protect
employees by ensuring that pension plans contained adequate vesting, funding or fiduciary stan-
da rds.
52 1d.
" 29 U.S.C. § 1031.
McGua., supra note 5, at 34. The Senate committee investigating the private pension system
identified four major problem areas in pension plan regulation. First, pension regulation lacked
uniform government standards. Second, inadequate vesting provisions prevented many lifelong
employees from receiving benefits. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973). See supra note
12 for a discussion of "vesting." Next, plans were funded inadequately, especially plans that ter-
minated before sufficient funds accumulated to pay promised benefits. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 9 (1973). Funding refers to the accumulation of assets to pay promised pension benefits,
Id. While the Internal Revenue Code required the employer to contribute an annual amount equal
to the pensions earned for that year, it did riot require the employer to make payments for benefits
earned before the inception of the plan. This is known as the "unfunded past service liability." Id.
Thus, when an employer terminated the plan, the plan often contained insufficient assets to meet
its obligations to plan participants. Id. For current rules on ER1SA minimum funding requirements,
see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-86.
Finally, credits earned lacked portability. S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1973).
"Portability" refers to the ability of the participant to transfer earned credits from one employer to
another. Id. The current mechanism for transferring vested benefits from the tax-qualified plan of
one employer to another tax-qualified plan or Individual Retirement Account generally consists of
receiving a distribution from the plan in which the employee has an interest and "rolling over" the
interest into the plan or the current employer. PENSION PLANNING, supra note 1 , at 415-19. Fur
current rules regarding the rollover provisions of the internal Revenue Code, see I.R.C. § 408(d)(3).
55 S. Rio'. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973). The Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
stated that the bill's provisions "are addressed to the issue of whether American working men and
women shall receive private pension plan benefits which they have been led to believe would be
theirs upon retirement from working lives." Id. As the Ninth Circuit stated, "(ERISA] is a compre-
hensive remedial statute designed to protect working men and women and to cure widespread
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with their own, rather than their employees', interests in mind. 56 Testimony before both
the House and Senate committees during the two years immediately prior to ERISA's
enactment is replete with stories of employees who worked for as many as 50 years with
the same employer only to lose their jobs, and their right to receive benefits, just before
the retirement age specified in a written agreement. 57 In other instances, employees lost
their benefits when an employer terminated a plan either because of the employer's
insolvency or the plan's failure to generate sufficient assets to pay its promised benefits."
Many employees were left with no job, no pension and no chance for a decent retirement.
In 1973, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare concluded that participants
lost their benefits primarily because of the way employers operated their plans. 59 In
1974, ten years . of investigation culminated in ERISA's enactment.
B. ERISA: Statutory Protection of Employee Benefit Rights
Congress enacted ERISA to protect employees who rely on promises of welfare and
pension benefits made by their employers." The Act is designed to provide uniform
standards for employee benefit plans, to prevent those who deal with such plans in a
discretionary manner from abusing that discretion, and to set minimum standards for
vesting and benefit accrual.6 t
Title I, the heart of ERISA, governs the protection of employee benefit rights. 62
These protections extend to virtually every employee benefit plan that is established by
an employer or an employee organization. 65 This part of the Act also provides for
reporting and disclosure," minimum participation and vesting standards," and mini-
mum funding standards."
weaknesses in the private pension system." Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1352 (9th Cir.
1984).
56 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 4.
52 120 CONG. REC. 29,934 (1974) (statement of Senator Davits).
51 Id.
59 S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973). The Committee stated that "participants lose
their benefits ... because of the manner in which the plan is executed with respect to its contractual
requirements." Id.
66 29 U.S.C. 1001(a). S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1973). In referring to a proposed
version of ERISA the Senate Report stated that Itlhe provisions of [the bill] ... respond [to the
need to protect employees] by mandating protective measures, and prescribing minimum standards
for promised benefits." Id.
6 ' HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at I.
62 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1145 (1982). In fact, Title 1 is called "Protection of Employee Benefit
Rights." Id.
65 Id. § 1003. See supra note 14 for ERISA's statutory coverage provisions. An "employer" is
defined under ERISA as any person acting directly as an employer or indirectly in the interest of
an employer, in relation to an employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. 1002(6). An "employee organi-
zation" is "any labor union or organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation
committee ... in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose ... of dealing with
employers concerning an employee benefit plan or any employees' beneficiary association
organized for the purpose ... of establishing the plan." Id. § 1002(4).
61 Id. §§ 1021-30.
65 Id. § 1053.
°6 1d. $§ 1081-86.
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Title I of ERISA also defines which employee benefit plans are covered by ER1SA. 67
Employee benefit plans include both welfare and pension benefit plans." Section 3(1) of
the Act defines an employee welfare benefit plan as any plan, fund or program estab-
lished or maintained by an employer to provide medical, disability, vacation and similar
benefits." Section 3(2) of ERISA further defines an employee pension benefit plan as
any plan, fund or program established or maintained by an employer, which arises by
express terms or results from surrounding circumstances, to provide retirement or other
income which has been deferred until the employment relationship ceases." Neither the
statute nor the legislative history defines the meaning of the term "established and
maintained" in section 3(1), nor what "surrounding circumstances" give rise to a plan
under section 3(2).
Proposed versions of ER1SA section 3(2) defining employee pension benefit plans
initially adopted the WPPDA's requirement that a plan be "communicated or its benefits
described in writing to employees." 71 The final version of section 3(2), which defines
pension benefit plans in ERISA, did not require specifically that a plan be communicated
in writing to employees.", None of the congressional inquiries from 1965 to 1974,
however, considered whether an employee benefit plan had to be in writing to qualify
as an employee benefit plan. Congress did not explain its reasons for deleting the writing
requirement when it adopted the final version of the Act."
Title I of ERISA also imposes fiduciary duties on those persons who deal with a
plan or plan assets on a discretionary basis. 74 A fiduciary who breaches his or her duty
to the plan or its participants may be liable personally for any losses arising from the
breach." Under the specific terms of the Act, a participant has a private right of action
to recover benefits due under a plan and to enforce the fiduciary's responsibilities under
the Act."
Although the coverage provisions contained in Part 1 of Title 1 of the Act do not
require that an ERISA plan be in writing, Part 4 of Title 1, which delineates an employer's
fiduciary responsibilities, states that a plan must be in writing." Specifically, section 402
contains a requirement that a plan be established and maintained pursuant to a written
instrument."" Because ERISA integrates the section 3 definitions of employee benefit
67 29 U.S.C. 1103.
68 Id. 1002(3). See supra note 15 for the statutory definition of an employee benefit plan.
" 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). See supra note 16 for the specific statutory definition of a welfare benefit
plan.
70 Id. § 1002(2). See supra note 17 for the specific statutory definition of a pension plan.
7' E.g., H.R. 9824, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
72 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2).
" H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN,
NEWS 5038, 5038-39 (joint statement of the committee conference).
" Id. § 1104. This section sets forth the standard of care required of ERISA fiduciaries.
75 Id. § 1109.
76 1d. § 1132. In addition, the Department of Labor may bring its own civil action to obtain
sanctions against those persons who breach their fiduciary duties, such as compelling fiduciaries to
disgorge profits that have been made through the use of plan assets, removing a fiduciary, and
other equitable relief as the court may deem appropriate. Id. § 1109(a). ERISA sets forth no specific
criminal sanctions for violations of fiduciary duties.
" 29 U.S.C. § 1102. For the specific statutory definition of the section 402 writing requirement
see supra note 18.
78 1d. 1102(a)(1). Section 402 of the Act also contains the requisite features of an employee
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plans into all of Title I, Title I's fiduciary responsibility provisions apply to all employee
benefit plans. 79
In ERISA's legislative history, section 402 is discussed in the section governing
fiduciary responsibities." The final joint committee report stated that a written plan was
required so that an employee could review plan documents to determine his or her
rights and obligations under the plan, as well as determine who was responsible for
operating the plan." Accordingly, section 402 requires a written plan to contain proce-
dures for funding the plan, provisions allocating the fiduciary responsibilities, procedures
for amendment and the basis for payments to and from the plan. 82 Thus, the legislative
history of section 402 of the Act indicates that a plan must be in writing principally to
aid the employee in ascertaining the exact benefit to which he or she is entitled.
The Act also imposes both general and specific duties upon individuals who exercise
any discretionary control over plan assets, render investment advice, or administer
employee benefit plans." The fiduciary duties imposed in section 404 are similar to the
duties of a fiduciary at common law." Section 404 requires the fiduciary to act in the
exclusive interest of the plan participants and beneficiaries. 85 Thus, a fiduciary must
exercise the same prudence and diligence that a reasonable person acting in a similar
capacity and familiar with such matters would use in similar circumstances.86
A breach of fiduciary duty may result in personal liability for any losses resulting
from the breach. 87 The Act provides that both plan participants or beneficiaries and the
benefit plan. Every plan must provide for the establishment of a funding policy, describe the basic
administrative functions, provide for the amendment of the plan, and specify the basis on which
payments are made to and from the plan. Id. § 1102(b). Subsection (c) sets forth the optional
features of the plan. Id. § 1 102(c).
79 Id. § 1002. The Act's definitional provisions integrate the definitions into the rest of Title I
by prefacing Act section '3, entitled Definitions, with the phrase for purposes of this title [the
following definitions applyr
"H.R. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 207, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Cone CONC. & ADMIN.
News 5030, 5077-78.
" Id. The committee report states that a written plan is required so "that every employee may
upon examining the plan documents, determine exactly what his rights and obligations are under
the plan. Also a written plan is required so the employees may know who is responsible for operating
the plan." Id.
82
 29 U.S.C. § 1002(b).
88 29 U.S.C. § 1104. As a fiduciary, the employer must establish a trust to hold the assets
contributed to its pension plan. Id. § 1003(a).
" S. REP. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1973). The Senate report states that "[Ole fiduciary
responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes applicable to these fiduciaries certain principles
developed in the evolution of the law of trusts." Id.
" '29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A).
86 1d. § 1104(a)(I)(B). Nevertheless, because of the complexity of administration of large trust
funds and the presumed expertise of fiduciaries, courts limit their review of trustees' decisions. See,
e.g., Holland v. Burlington Indus., 772 F.2d 1140, 1148 (4th Cir. 1985) (court employs arbitrary
and capricious standard to review fiduciary's actions regarding severance pay plan), aff'd mem., 106
S. Ct. 3267 (1986). In general, a court will overturn a trustee's decision with respect to the
administration of the plan only if the trustee's actions were "arbitrary, capricious or made in bad
faith." See, e.g., id. at 1148; Jung v. FMC Corp., 755 F.2d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 1985).
87 29 U.S.C. § 1109. See supra note 76 and accompanying text for a discussion of other remedies
for a trustee's breach of fiduciary duty.
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Department of Labor have standing to bring actions for 'breaches of fiduciary duty. 8R
Because courts have held that the purpose of the fiduciary responsibility provisions is to
deter fiduciary misconduct, the plaintiff may bring an action even if the plan suffers no
direct loss due to the breach." IF the court finds a fiduciary breach, the plaintiff may
recover, on behalf of the plan, all damages directly from the employer." In such a case,
the amount of damages is equal to the profits earned by defendant as a result of the
breach of fiduciary duty, or losses sustained by the plan as a result of defendant's
breach."'
Finally, the Act specifically provides that federal law is the exclusive authority over
ERISA-covered plans.' Thus, although states regulated employee benefit plans before
ERISA," 3 ERISA pre-empts all state law regulation of employee benefit plans," including
all state law contract claims relating to ERISA covered plans."' The pre-empted slate
rights are replaced by a federal right of action.'" Moreover, courts have construed
ERISA's pre-emption provisions broadly.°
C. Judicial Interpretation of ERISA's Coverage Provisions
Although the Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction, Congress left many
gaps in the employee benefit regulatory scheme. In particular, ERISA does not refer to
a body of contract law governing the interpretation and enforcement of employee benefit
plans." As the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted in Menhorn
v, Firestone, Congress intended the courts to develop a body of substantive federal law
to deal with issues arising under ERISA." Accordingly, the courts have incorporated
"8 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
" See, e.g., Leigh v. Engle, 727 F,2d 113, 122-27 (7th Cir. 1984).
"" McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100, 109 (3d Cir. 1986). In McDowell, the plaintiff-employees
claimed that the trustees' failttre to collect contributions owed by the employer to the plan breached
the trustees' fiduciary duties to the plan. Id. at 108. The court rejected this argument because the
company had obtained government approval of a "waiver" of contributions from the Internal
Revenue Service. Id.
• "1 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
" 2 Leigh, 727 .F.2d at 122.
"See generally Note, Rights of Retired Workers, supra note 31, at 916-24.
":I 29 U.S.C. § 1144. Section 514 provides, in pertinent part: leixcept as provided in subsection
(b) Irelating to state regulation of insurance] ... the provisions of this subchapter ... shall supersede
any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
." Id. Any state law, however, which regulates insurance, banking or securities is not pre-empted
under ERISA. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(A). Any cause of action which arose before January 1, 1975 also is
not pre-erupted by federal law. Id. § 1144(b)(1).
" See Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522-23 (1981) (workers' compensation
offset permitted).
" 29 U.S.C. § 1132.
97 See, e.g., Powell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va., 780 F.2d 419, 421 (4th Cir. 1985),
cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 2892 (1986).
9" Ray & Halpern, The Common Law of ERISA, 21 TRIAL 20, 22 ( June 1985).
31 733 F.2d 1496, 1498-1500 (9th Cir. 1984). The court stated that Congress "empowered the
courts to develop, in the light of reason and experience, a body of federal common law governing
employee benefits plans." Id. at 1499. 120 CONG. Rm. 29,942 (1974) (statement of Senator Davits).
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contract, trust and labor law doctrines into a substantive federal law governing rights
and obligations under private employee benefit plans.'"
One contract law principle that courts apply in the employee benefit context is the
doctrine of the statute of frauds. 10 ' A state's statute of frauds generally requires, among
other things, that a contract which is not to be performed within one year of its making
must be in writing. 102 Before Congress enacted ERISA, courts that applied pure contract
theory to benefit plans found that the applicable statute of frauds precluded the en-
forcement of unwritten proniises of benefits which could not be fulfilled within one year
of the making of the contract.'" Thus, before ERISA, unwritten promises of employee
benefits generally were not enforceable in a contract action.
In a post-ERISA action in 1985, Nachwalter v. Christie, the Federal District Court for
the Southern District of Florida treated section 402 as a statute of frauds, holding that
an alleged oral amendment to a written retirement plan was invalid because it contra-
vened the section's writing requirement.'" In Islachwalter, the express terms of the plan
precluded distribution of benefits until one year after the participant incurred a "break
in service." 1 u5 Before the benefits were distributed to the plaintiff, however, the value of
the plan assets decreased through the malfeasance of an unrelated third party)" The
plaintiff claimed that the trustees should be bound by their oral agreement to value the
benefits in the plan at an earlier date than that stated in the plan, that is, at a date before
the decrease in the entire fund's value.'" The Nachwalter district court rejected the
plaintiff's argument and held that an oral agreement to change the express terms of an
ERISA plan is unenforceable.'" The district court interpreted the section 402 writing
requirement to preclude a cause of action based on any oral agreement to provide
10" Ray & Halpern, supra note 98, at 22.
'u' Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. 2 ch.3 (1677), reprinted in W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEACH, EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATION RIGHTS & REMEDIES 55 (1985).
152 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. L. ch. 259, § I (1959). Nearly every American jurisdiction has adopted
a statute of frauds except Pennsylvania, North Carolina and Louisiana. W. HOLLOWAY & M. LEACH,
supra note 101, at 55.
' )5 See, e.g., Lee v. Jenkins Bros., 268 F.2d 357,372-73 (2d Cir.) (employees' claim for pension
benefits that were allegedly orally promised by employer barred by the Connecticut Statute of
Frauds), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959).
'°4 611 F. Supp. 655,663 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 805 F.2d 956 (11th Cir. 1986).
' 08 1d. at 659. A "break in service" is a period during which the employee works for fewer than
500 hours of service in a consecutive 12-month computation period selected in the plan. I.R.C.
§ 411(a)(6) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). A break in service affects the employee's accrual, vesting, and
participation in the plan and usually occurs when an employee severs employment with the company.
See McGill., supra note 5, at 89. In Nachwalier, the significance of the break in service period related
to the date that benefits from the plan were to be distributed to the participant. 611 F. Stipp. at
658-60. A terminated participant could receive his or her plan benefit only upon written request
within 30 days following a break in service. Id. if the participant failed to request the plan distri-
bution he or she would be required to wait an additional twelve months before he or she could
request a distribution of his or her benefit from the plan. Id. at 658-60. Thus, because the plaintiff
terminated employment before his death and had not requested a distribution immediately after
his break in service, his beneficiaries were not entitled to receive his benefit at any date earlier than
he himself would have been entitled had he lived. Id. at 664.
'uu Nachwalter, 611 F. Supp. at 657.
1 ° 7 Id. at 661.
IQ8 Id.
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benefits.w° The district court extrapolated from this premise that the writing requirement
precludes oral amendments to written plans."°
The Nachwalter district court reasoned by analogy to cases involving Section 302(c)(5)
of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"),'" the federal labor statute that
includes a writing requirement similar to section 402 for plans and trusts established
pursuant to collective bargaining agreernents." 2 The policy behind the LMRA writing
requirement, the Nachwalter district court stated, is to prevent collusion to the detriment
of beneficiaries." 3 In the district court's view, this policy is applicable also to ER1SA
plans.'" The district court further recognized that oral statements invite such collusion
and are difficult to prove. 15 The Nachwalter district court thus refused to enforce the
alleged oral amendment to the written retirement plan. 116
109 Id. The court stated that "[ails oral agreement cannot be the basis of a cause of action under
ERISA due to the fact that such an oral agreement would be contrary to the express provisions of
ERISA." Id.
Ho Id. Courts also have held that agreements to extend eligibility in employee benefit plans to
individuals not covered under the terms of the plan contravene Section 402 of the Act. See, e.g.,
Saret v. Trifonn Corp. No. 83-C-4650 (N.D. III. Aug. 22, 1986) (LEXIS, Gelded library, Dist file).
In Sure!, for example, the court rejected the plaintiff's claims for medical benefits under an ERISA
welfare plan maintained by the company for frill-time employees. Id. 'File plaintiff, a former part-
time director of the defendant company, argued that the employer was estopped from not providing
the benefits because the employer already had enrolled the plaintiff in the plan under a false
designation as a full-time employee. Id. The court found that the terms of the plan were specific
as to the classification of covered employees and that the plaintiff was not among those employees.
Id. The court reasoned that the Section 402 writing requirement was a "central feature" of the Act
and "not a mere technicality." Id. Thus, the court concluded that the purpose of the writing
requirement, to protect the plan from collusion which may arise from private verbal agreements,
would be contravened by extending eligibility to the plaintiff. ld.
'" 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1982). Section 302(c)(5) is a penal statute which provides that, as a
condition precedent to its existence, a plan established under a collective bargaining agreement of
which a unions member is trustee must be in writing. Id. Section 302(c)(5), however, provides no
independent basis for regulating plans. See United Mine Workers Ass'n v. Robinson, 455 U.S. 562,
570-72 (1982).
112 Section 302 of the LMRA provides its pertinent part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any employer or association of employers or any person
who acts .. in the interest of an employer to pay, lend, or deliver; or agree to pay,
lend, or deliver, any money or other thing of value —
(1) to any representative of any of his employees who are employed in an industry
affecting commerce ....
(c) !except that] this section shall not be applicable ... (5) with respect to money or
other thing of value paid to a trust fund established by such representative for the
sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of the employer ... Provided, That ... (B)
the detailed basis on which such payments are to be made is specified in a written
agreement with the employer ....
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). Congress designed section 302(c)(5) to "prevent bribery, extortion, and
corruption of' the collective bargaining process." Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters Pension Fund
v. Strom, 634 F. Supp. 163, 173 (N.D. Ill. 198f1).
Nathwalter, (ill F. Supp, at 662.
114 id
115 Id. at 663.
11 ' 1 Id. at 662-63,
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In 1986, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
Nachwaller district court's refusal to enforce the oral plan amendment."' The Eleventh
Circuit adopted the district court's finding that the section 402 writing requirement
precluded oral modification of a written plan.lig The appeals court stated that only
agreements "established and maintained" pursuant to written instruments were enforce-
able under ERISA." 9
 To hold otherwise, the appeals court reasoned, would undermine
ERISA's goal of protecting employees' interests because employees would be unable to
rely on the written plan's terins.' 2° The appeals court also found that this reliance
problem would be exacerbated by the lengthy time lapse that would be likely to occur
between the making of the oral agreement and the benefit distribution. 121
 Thus, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded, oral agreements should not be enforced. 122
In the post-ERISA period, however, several courts have held that the lack of a
writing does not render an ERISA welfare benefit plan unenforceable.' 23 The seminal
ruling in this line of decisions is the 1982 case of Donovan v. Dillingham.I 24 In Dillingham,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that an unwritten
program to provide medical benefits to employees through the purchase of insurance
constituted an ERISA plan.' 25
In Dillingham, the Secretary of Labor brought suit against the trustees of a "multiple
employer insurance trust," alleging that the trustees, in determining benefits, had vio-
lated ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions. 126 To determine whether these trustees were
subject to ERISA's fiduciary duties, the court first had to cleterniine whether the group
purchase of insurance policies constituted an employee benefit plan under the Act.'"
The defendant employer claimed that the mere purchase of health insurance by sub-
scription to a multiple employer trust did not establish an employee welfare benefit plan
subject to ERISA. 128 The employer further argued that, because the purchase of insur-
ance did not result in the accumulation of plan assets, nor in employer liability for
117
 Nachwalter v. Christie, 805 F.2d 951, 961 (11th Cir. 1986). In Nachwalter, the Eleventh
Circuit made no attempt to distinguish Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367 (11th Cir. 1982), in
which it held, on the basis of the general definitions contained in ERISA, that oral agreements to
provide employee benefits are enforceable under ERISA. The Nachwalter court ignored the Dil-
lingham decision and instead relied entirely on the section 402 writing requirement. Thus, a conflict
exists within the Eleventh Circuit on the proper interpretation of the writing requirement.
Nachwalter, 805 F.2d at 960.
119 Id.
170
 Id. at 960-61.
121 Id. at 960.
122 Id. at 961.
' 23 See, e.g., Gilbert v. Burlington Indus., 765 F.2d 320, 325 (2c1 Cir. 1985); Donovan v. Dil-
lingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1372 (11th Cir. 1982).
174 688 F.2d 1367 (I I th Cir. 1982).
1 " Id. at 1373-74.
176 Id. at 1369. A multiple-employer trust, also known as a "MET," is an organization to which
many employers belong for the purpose of providing welfare benefits to employees. See Brummond,
The Legal Status of Uninsured, Noncollectively-Bargained Multiple-Employer Welfare Trusts Under ERISA
and State Insurance Laws, 28 SYRACUSE L. REV. 701, 703 (1977). initially there was some question
whether ERISA pre-empted state law regulation of METs because the activities of the METs were
similar to those of insurance providers, who are not pre-erupted. Id. at 703-05. In 1983, however,
Congress amended ERISA to resolve the question by specifically excluding METs from the pre-
emption provisions of the Act. 29 U.S.C. 1144(3)(6).
127 Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1372.
/d. at. 1370.
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benefits, no trust, and hence, no "plan," as defined by ERISA existed.'" Thus, the
employer claimed, the fiduciary provisions of ERISA should not apply.'"
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the employer's arguments and concluded that ERISA
does not require a formal written plan." In finding that the group insurance plan
constituted an ERISA plan, the Dillingham court first recognized that surrounding cir-
cumstances may give rise to an ERISA plan. "2 Once an ERISA plan is found, the court
continued, it is then subject to ERISA's fiduciary requirements.'" The court reasoned,
therefore, that it was the fiduciary's responsibility to provide a writing and not a prereq-
uisite to coverage under the ACt.' 34 The court stated that to construe the Act to require
a writing as a prerequisite to coverage would be inconsistent with the purposes of ERISA
because it would allow the breach of fiduciary duty to preclude the existence of the
plan.'" The court concluded that such an interpretation would deny benefits to the very
group ERISA was intended to protect.' 46
The Dillingham court, however, rejected the Department of Labor's contention that
the employer's "ultimate decision" to establish a plan to provide benefits gave rise to an
ERISA plan.'" No single act, the court stated, establishes a plan. 138 Rather, the court
reasoned, if a reasonable person could determine from the surrounding circumstances
the intended benefits, the beneficiaries, the source of funding and the benefit claims
procedure, an ERISA plan existed. The court found in this case that the purchase of
an insurance policy was substantial evidence that the employer had established a plan.'"
Similarly, in Scott a. Gulf Oil Corp. the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that an
ERISA plan may exist notwithstanding the lack of a written document. 141 The issue in
Scott was whether an alleged severance pay practice — unwritten and funded out of the
employer's general assets — constituted an employee welfare benefit plan subject to
ERISA. 142 The court held that because ERISA's writing requirement was not part of the
definition contained in section 3( l) of the Act, failure to meet the writing requirement
did not preclude the existence of a plan. 143. Rather, the court concluded that the lack of
129 Id.
1" Id.
151 Id. at 137'2,
' 52 1d.
'" Id. at 1372-73.
1" Id. at 1372. As the court stated, "clearly these are only the responsibilities of ... fiduciaries
and are not prerequisites to coverage under the Act." Id.
'" Id.
j°9 Id.
1°7 Id. at 1372-73.
158 Id. at 1373.
' 09 Id.
140 Id. at 1374-75.
141 754 F. 2d 1499, 1503 (9th Cir. 1986). The Scott court specifically agreed with the Eleventh
Circuit's decision in Dillingham, stating that ''the existence of a written instrument is not a prereq-
uisite to ERISA coverage." Id.
142 Scott, 754 F.2r1 at 1501-03. The defendant acknowledged that ERISA covered severance
benefits, but argued that the practice, if it existed, constituted a "payroll practice," which was exempt
from coverage under ERISA. Id. at 1502. The court rejected this argument on the grounds that
the definition or a payroll practice was quite specific and severance pay was not among the named
categories. Id. at 1503. See supra note 14 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory
exemptions and regulatory exclusions from ERISA.
149 754 F.2d at 1503-04.
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a written instrument resulted from a failure to comply with the fiduciary provisions of
ERISA.'" The court also adopted the Dillingham court's conclusion that a mere assertion
that an employer decided to establish a benefit does not result in ERISA coverage, but
the existence of a plan depended on whether a reasonable person could determine the
intended benefits, the beneficiaries, the funding source and the benefit claims proce-
dure. 145
 Consequently, the Scott court remanded the case to the district court to determine
whether the asserted practice in fact constituted a plan under the Dillingham standard) 4'
Conversely, the existence of a writing does not automatically create a plan. 197 In the
1986 case of Taylor v. Hercules, for example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that
a pamphlet that described severance benefits did not give rise to an ERISA plan.'" The
pamphlet in Taylor contained a statement that some employer locations provided sever-
ance pay. 149 The same page of the pamphlet also contained a caveat to the effect that
the summary was incomplete and that employees covered by a severance pay plan would
receive a plan description at their location. 159 Although the summary referred to a formal
plan document,"' it merely summarized "typical plan benefits" in effect at most of the
company's locations. 152 The court construed this language as not promising any particular
benefit)." Further, the court reasoned that because the employee was on notice as to the
existence of a formal document, he could not properly rely solely on the summary plan
description to establish a right to benefits)"
Similarly, another court has found that a minor written reference to a benefit does
not establish a plan subject to ERISA) 99 In Molyneux v. Arthur Guinness and Sons, the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected the plaintiff-
employee's contention that the mention of a possible termination benefit in a letter
agreement between the employer and employee constituted an ERISA plan. 156 The court,
applying the standards enunciated in Dillingham, dismissed the claim on the grounds
that the plaintiff failed to allege that other employees were aware that the company had
a practice of paying severance benefits, that the company had established benefit claim
"4 Id. at 1503.
1 " Id. at 1504.
146 /d. at 1506.
147 See, e.g., Taylor v. Hercules, Inc., 780 F.2d 171, 175 (1st Cir. 1986).
149 Id. at 175.
1 " Id. at 173.
150 1d.
151 Id.
" Id. at 175.
'" Id.
154 Id.
"5 See, e.g., Molyneux v. Arthur Guinness & Sons, 616 F. Supp. 240, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). A
written agreement to provide retirement benefits to one employee pursuant to an individual
retirement contract also is not an ERISA plan. Jervis v. Elerding, 504 F. Supp. 606, 608 (C.D. Cal.
1980). In Jervis, the court found that an employment contract that recited as additional consideration
certain in-kind pension benefits was a "personal service contract" and not an ERISA plan. Id. at
608. The court adopted the Department of Labor's position that such employment contracts were
part of the employee's compensation arrangement rather than an ERISA pension plan. Id. at 609.
For an excellent discussion of exempt compensation arrangements see generally Goodman & Stone,
supra note 13.
156 Id. at 243.
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procedures, that the company had identified covered employees or that the company
had determined a method of funding or benefit calculations. 157
In sum, courts differ on the issue of whether ERISA requires a plan to be in writing
to be enforceable under the Act. As recently as 1986 a federal appeals court held that
the writing requirement contained in section 402 of ERISA precluded the enforcement
of unwritten agreernents.'m Several other federal courts, however, have held that the
section 402 writing requirement does not preclude enforcement of unwritten plans, but
gives rise to a fiduciary duty to put the plan into writing, and a breach of fiduciary duty
for failure to do so. 159 Moreover, these courts follow the Dillingham standard to determine
that an ERISA plan exists, in the absence of a writing, where a reasonable person could
determine from the surrounding circumstances the intended benefits, the beneficiaries,
the source of funding and the benefit claims procedures.'"°
In conclusion, ERISA is not explicit as to whether the lack of a written instrument
renders an employee benefit plan unenforceable. Neither ERISA's definitional provi-
sions, nor the Act's coverage provisions require a written plan. The fiduciary provisions,
however, require that the employer establish and maintain an ERISA plan pursuant to
a written document. Further, this conflict has resulted in courts differing as to whether
the writing requirement is a prerequisite to coverage under the Act. Most judicial
decisions on this issue hold that the lack of a writing does not preclude coverage under
ERISA, but instead gives rise to a breach of fiduciary duty.
II. ASSESSING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF INFORMAL AGREEMENTS TO PROVIDE EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS
Congress enacted ERISA principally to protect employees' expectations of welfare
and pension benefits. To ensure the effectiveness of ERISA, therefore, courts clearly
should find oral promises to pay welfare and retirement benefits enforceable under
ER ISA. The statutory language of ERISA, as well as its legislative history, and the judicial
interpretation of its provisions supports this conclusion.
Given the enormous liabilities that employers potentially may incur upon the en-
forcement of an oral promise to pay benefits, however, the standard must clearly define
when such a plan exists. The Dillingham standard that courts currently follow is inade-
quate because it does not satisfactorily balance the expectations of the employee against
the employer's need to know with certainty when liability attaches under ERISA. This
note suggests that a stricter standard, which incorporates the concept of an employee's
justifiable reliance with the Dillingham standard, would provide employers reasonable
certainty and protection against liability under ERISA.
The following section analyzes the reasons courts should enforce oral promises to
pay benefits under ERISA and suggests the proper standard to determine when oral
promises give rise to an ERISA plan. Part A of this section reviews the statutory language
157
 Molyneux, 616 F. Supp. at 243-44.
155 Nachwalter, 805 F.2d at 960-61.
' 59 See, e.g., Scott, 754 F.2d at 1503-04 (severance pay practice may constitute a plan); Dillingham,
688 F.2d at 1372-77 (purchase of insurance found to be an ER1SA plan even though no written
plan adopted by the employer).
RI° See, e.g., Scott, 754 F.2d at 1504; Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Smith, 630 F. Supp. 262, 264
(W.D.N.Y. 1986); Molyneux, 616 F. Supp. at 243.
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and legislative history of ERISA and the interpretation given it by the courts, and
concludes that Congress intended for courts to enforce oral promises under ERISA.
Part B reviews the Dillingham standard for determining when oral promises give rise to
an ERISA plan. The note then concludes that a standard which includes the requirement
of justifiable reliance on the part of the employee is more appropriate, in the absence
of a writing, to determine when an ERISA plan exists.
A. Enforceability of Oral Promises to Provide Employee Benefits
Congress did not state explicitly that oral promises to provide employee benefits
would be enforceable under ERISA. That Congress intended such a result, however, is
supported by the nature of ERISA itself. Because the statutory language of sections 3(3)
and 402 of the Act are ambiguous when read together, however, it is necessary to examine
the legislative history — as well as the policies and purposes of ERISA — to discern that
Congress did not intend the Act's writing requirement to preclude the enforceability of
oral promises. In addition, the developing judicial interpretation of ERISA's statutory
requirements confirms the sound conclusion that Congress intended to enforce oral
promises to pay benefits under ERISA.
The Act's definition of employee benefit plans does not mandate the existence of a
written document. Section 3(1) defines a welfare plan as one that is established or
maintained by an employer, although the section does not define the term "established
or maintained."'" Similarly, section 3(2) defines an employee benefit pension plan as
one established or maintained by an employer and which may arise by express terms or
by surrounding circumstances. 162 Neither of the Act's definitional provisions explicitly
mandates that a benefit plan be in writing. 16'
Section 402, however, requires that each employee benefit plan be "established and
maintained pursuant to a written instrument."'" Because Title I incorporates section 3
definitions, the writing requirement, contained in the part of ERISA delineating fiduciary
duties, applies to all employee benefit plans.'" The statute does not address specifically
the consequences of an employer's failure to memorialize a promised benefit in writing.
The inclusion and integration of section 3 definitions into section 402's writing
requirement renders ambiguous the Act's writing requirement. Two possible interpre-
tations of section 402 exist. Section 402, may be considered merely to set forth the
employer's fiduciary obligations to plan beneficiaries. In contrast, section 402 may be
interpreted to preclude enforcement of oral promises to pay benefits. Examining the
161 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). See supra note 16 and accompanying text for the statutory definition
of a welfare benefit plan.
' 62
 29 U.S.C. 1002(2). See supra note 17 and accompanying text for the statutory definition
of a pension plan.
,63
 The Act's coverage provision also does not require that a plan be in writing. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1003(a).
A comparison of regulations issued by the Department of Labor under ERISA also indicates
that the Act does not require a writing to establish an ERISA plan. See 29 C.F.R. 2510.3-37(b)(2)(i)(A)
(multi-employer plans covered by "withdrawal liability" provisions on ERISA's enactment date not
considered to be in existence unless reduced to writing; thus if Congress wanted ERISA to require
a writing generally it could have said so more clearly).
'" 29 U.S.C. 1102(a). See supra note 18 and accompanying text for the statutory language of
the writing requirement.
165 29 U.S.C. § 1002.
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legislative history of the Act and Congress's purpose in enacting ERISA resolves this
ambiguity.
The legislative history of section 402 consistently discusses the writing requirement
as a fiduciary duty. 166 This duty arises from the administrative aspects of the plan.' 67
Congress expected the written plan to enable each employee, by examining the plan
documents, to find out the information necessary to enforce his or her rights. L68 Thus,
to construe the absence of a writing as precluding the plan's existence would deny
benefits to those individuals the Act was designed to protect. 169
Arguably, however, section 402 also serves as a statute of frauds. The statute of
frauds requires a writing to exist in certain situations before an agreement may be
enforced. , " This writing requirement serves an evidentiary purpose by providing "proof
that the agreement was actually made."' 7 ' A statute of frauds provision in the retirement
benefit plan context, therefore, could inform a plan participant of his or her rights, and
serve as evidence of the promise made by the employer to pay benefits,I 72 It would he
inequitable to subject an employer to potentially enormous liability for promised retire-
ment benefits on the basis of what might be a misunderstood or casual statement.
ERISA's overriding purpose, however, was not to protect employers against the
enforcement of oral promises. Rather, Congress fashioned ERISA to protect employees'
expectations of promised benefits. Consequently, Congress intended that courts broadly
construe the Act's coverage provisions.'" As the Senate Committee on Labor arid Public
Welfare reported, "coverage under the Act [is] to be construed liberally to provide the
maximum degree of protection to working men and women covered by private retire-
ment programs. Conversely, exemptions should be confined to their narrow purpose. "L74
The incorporation of a statute of frauds provision, which protects promisors, in the
section of the Act governing the promisor's fiduciary duties, therefore is inconsistent
with the overriding purpose of the Act to protect employees' benefit rights.
Furthermore, ERISA's historical background demonstrates that Congress did not
intend the section 402 writing requirement to codify the statute of frauds in ER1SA.
ERISA's enactment resulted from Congress's awareness that employees, under the ex-
isting inconsistent state law, could not rely on or enforce their employers' promises to
provide adequate retirement benefits. 175 Congress correctly saw that the proposed leg-
islation must focus on the areas of fiduciary responsibility and disclosure in order to
provide more than the inadequate requirements found in the WPPDA. 176 Congress
included the section 402 writing requirement among these fiduciary provisions. 177
165 H.R. Rio.. No. 12811, 93(1 Cong., 1st Sess. '295-98, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5038, 5076-78.
117 See McMahon v. Mc Dowell, 794 F.2d 100, 109-10 (3d Cir. 1986).
15 0 H.R. REO. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 1st Sess', 297, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Coot? CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5038, 5077-78.
See Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1372.
17" See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Statute of Frauds.
171
 E. FARNswoicrit, CONTRACTS 372 (1982).
172 Id,
l " S. Rey. No. 127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1973).
' 71 Id.
17 ' 120 CoNc. REG. 29,933-34 (1974) (statement of Senator Davits).
170 Senate Consideration of S.4, reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE, RETIRE-
MENT 1NcomE Sreurtrry ACT, 1974, at 1637 (speech of Senator Lloyd Bentsen).
' 77 29 U.S,C. §§ 1101-1102.
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Although ERISA does not predicate a plan's existence on a written instrument,
employers are encouraged to have written plans in order to obtain favorable tax treat-
ment under the Internal Revenue Code.'" Employee benefits plans that qualify under
section 401 of the Code, however, also must comply with ERISA."° A plan which fails
to qualify for favorable tax treatment for lack of a writing, therefore, still must comply
with ERISA. 18° Thus, the current legislative scheme encourages, but does not mandate,
employers to commit benefit plans to writing.
In sum, although the statutory provisions alone fail to clarify whether a plan must
be in writing to be covered under the Act, an examination of the legislative history and
of' Congress's purpose in enacting ERISA indicates that the Act's writing requirement is
a fiduciary duty and does not preclude enforcement of an oral agreement. Congress
enacted ERISA to protect employees' expectations in receiving benefits from employers
who, in the past, had not operated their plans in the employees' best interest. 181 To
permit lack of a written instrument to preclUde coverage would be inconsistent with
ERISA's purpose of protecting employee's expectations; it would permit employers to
avoid liability upon breaching promises actually made to employees.
Moreover, the majority of courts that have considered the question found that an
ERISA plan may exist without a writing. There courts have concluded that section 402
operates solely to set forth the employer's fiduciary responsibilities.'" Courts, therefore,
generally do not predicate coverage under ERISA upon a writing. To deny the existence
of the plan, these courts reasoned, would allow employers to escape ERISA's coverage
by violating the Act's fiduciary requirements, a result clearly inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the Act.' 83 Moreover, these courts have recognized that the Act itself provides
that surrounding circumstances may give rise to an ERISA plan. Thus, a majority of
courts have found that an ERISA plan may exist without a writing.
Nevertheless, one court has held that oral agreements to provide benefits are unen-
forceable in light of section 402's writing requirement. 184 The courts in Nachwalter,
however, read section 402 in isolation. Section 402 is but one part of a comprehensive
statutory scheme, and must be read in connection with other provisions of the Act,
particularly sections 3(1) and 3(2). The Nachwalter district court's reasoning focused on
a valid purpose for imposing the writing requirement, that is, the need to prevent
collusion.' 85 But the district court failed to reconcile this policy, in light of the conflicting
statutory language, with the overriding purpose of the Act, that is, to protect employees'
expectations in receiving promised benefits. Further, although the Eleventh Circuit
considered ERISA's purposes in deciding Nachwalter, it failed to consider the explicit
definitional language contained in section 3(2) and ignored its own analysis and reasoning
set forth in Dillingham. Thus, the interpretation given by the Nachwalter courts is of
limited use in determining the scope of the writing requirement.
' 78 I.R.C. § 401(a)(1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.401-1(a)(2).
179 Note, Private Enforcement, supra note 18, at 275.
'Bo Id.
18 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 10, at 5.
' 42 See, e.g., Scott, 754 F.2d at 1503-04 (severance pay practice may constitute a plan); Dillingham,
688 17.2d at 1372-73 (purchase of insurance constituted an ERISA plan).
"3 See, e.g., Scott. 754 F.2d at 1503.
'e* 611 F. Supp. at 663. See Taylor v. Hercules, Inc., 780 F.2d 171 (1st Cir. 1986), See supra
note 147 and accompanying text for all example of a writing which does not give rise to a plan.
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In sum, most of the judicial decisions addressing whether a plan must be in writing
to be enforceable under ERISA hold that no such writing is required. These decisions
ensure employee expectations, a result consistent with Congress's intent. To allow an
employer to escape liability by violating the statute, i.e., by failing to put a plan in writing,
the courts reason, creates a result inconsistent with the main purpose of ERISA. More-
over, the sole case that decided this issue to the contrary, Nachwalter v. Christie, did so in
the context of an oral modification to a written agreement. Moreover, Nachwalter was
decided in the same circuit that decided Dillingham, a strong precedent to the contrary.
B. Standards for Determining When an Oral Agreement Becomes Enforceable Under ERISA
Given this note's conclusion that Congress intended courts to enforce oral promises
under ERISA, it is necessary to determine when such oral promises establish an ERISA
plan. The enormous liabilities that potentially could accrue to employers and fiduciaries,
however, necessitate a clearly established standard, The Dillingham court established
criteria that the majority of courts currently follow to determine when a benefit plan
exists, that is, when a reasonable person could determine the plan benefits, the benefi-
ciaries, the source of financing and the benefit claims procedure.'" The Dillingham
standard is inadequate, however, because it produces uncertainty as to when liability
attaches under ERISA. Thus, courts ought to adopt a stricter standard before oral
agreements are enforced under ERISA. This stricter standard should incorporate the
concept of justifiable reliance. Before an Oral agreement would be enforceable under
ERISA, the employees would need to show that they relied to their detriment on the
employers' alleged promise.
Without a clear standard to determine when oral promises give rise to an ERISA
plan, employers may be discouraged from providing benefits to employees. Employers
who do not demonstrate clearly their intent to establish a plan via a written document
create several problems. First, oral promises are subject to significant problems of proof.
To find an employer liable based soley on testimony of oral statements may invite
collusion among the intended beneficiaries. The employees also may misinterpret the
statements. Because Congress enacted ERISA to provide a uniform standard For em-
ployee benefit plans on which employers and employees could rely, allowing undefined
facts to give rise to a plan could create uncertainty among both employers and employees
as to what actions are necessary to establish a plan. This uncertainty would be counter-
productive to the purposes of ERISA because employers would be discouraged from
establishing plans.
If an oral promise is enforced without a clear standard, employers could face
enormous potential liabilities because they will not know whether they are required to
comply with the funding or reporting and disclosure requirements of both ERISA and
the Internal Revenue Code. For example, in a situation involving an oral retirement
contract where the plan computes the benefit with regard to years of service, the em-
ployer would not Only be liable for future benefits earned, but also for accrued benefits
which have not yet been funded. This liability for unfunded past service is potentially
enormous. In fact, when an employer establishes a plan and elects to provide for past
service, ERISA allows the employer to amortize this cost over a thirty year period.' 87 If
"" Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1373.
241 U.S.C. § 1082(h)(2)(B).
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an employer erroneously believes the promise to be unenforceable under ERISA and
fails to maintain minimum funding standards, the employer may be required to con-
tribute a large lump sum immediately to fund all amounts that should have been
contributed.
Moreover, if the corporation does not have sufficient assets to meet its pension
obligations, the breaching fiduciary may become personally liable for the remaining
liability)" In a situation involving an oral defined benefit plan a particularly egregious
situation results. Failing to meet the minimum funding requirement may produce a
penalty greater than 100% of the amount due. L89 The breach subjects the employer and
the fiduciaries to additional penalties for failing to file the appropriate periodic disclosure
forms with the government.'"
In view of the problems possibly created by enforcing oral promises to pay under
ERISA, therefore, courts must establish a clear standard to determine when an oral
ERISA plan exists. The Dillingham court set forth criteria for determining the existence
of an employee benefit plan subject to ERISA. According to the Dillingham court, a plan
exists where a reasonable person can determine the intended benefits, the beneficiaries,
the source of financing and the benefit claims procedure.' 91 Dillingham, however, inad-
equately set forth the criteria because a past practice, without an explicit oral promise,
may give rise to an ERISA plan. This is best demonstrated in Scot/ v. Gulf Oil, where the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that an alleged past practice to pay severance
benefits may have given rise to a plan subject to ER1SA) 92 The inherent problem in
Scott v. Gulf Oil is that of determining what level of practice establishes a plan. If the
existence of a past practice allows the inference of an oral promise which meets the
Dillingham standard, it is arguable that when any two employees have been given a
benefit an ERISA plan exists. Even where the practice of paying benefits is inconsistent,
an ERISA plan still may be found. Applying the Dillingham criteria a "plan" founded on
past practice arises and becomes subject to ERISA at an unknowable point in time. This
uncertainty is counterproductive to the goals of ERISA because it discourages the estab-
lishment of benefit programs by making such plans both onerous and risky. Thus, while
it seems clear that a writing need not exist for a plan to arise under ERISA, courts
should adopt a higher standard than Dillingham.
The inadequate Dillingham standard, therefore, necessitates establishment of a stan-
dard that takes into account the need to protect employees' expectations without sub-
jecting the employer to hidden liabilities. Courts should incorporate an additional ele-
ment into the Dillingham standard: justifiable reliance. When an employee has relied to
his or her detriment on the employer's alleged promise and the Dillingham criteria have
been met, courts should enforce the promise. Under this alternative, the employer who
represents the existence of an employee benefit on which an employee justifiably relies
to his or her detriment, would be estopped from asserting the lack of a written instrument
"'See supra note 76 and accompanying text for a discussion of remedies for fiduciaries'
breaches under ERISA.
189 1.R.C. § 4971 (1982). There is an intial tax of 5% for late payment of the amount owed to
the plan. Id. If the employer fails to cure the deficiency within time periods set forth in § 4971, a
100% non-deductible tax is assessed against the employer. Id.
m See, e.g., 2 PENSION PLAN GUIDE (CCH) 1i 5542 (I.R.S. Form 5500, Annual Return of Em-
ployee Benefit Plan, 1985) (instruction form lists the daily penalty for failing to file as $25).
" I
 Dillingham, 688 F.2d at 1373.
"2
 754 F.2d at 1503-04.
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as a bar to enforcement)" Thus, an employee seeking to obtain alleged benefits would
need to prove the existence of the plan by demonstrating the Dillingham criteria in
combination with the employee's justifiable reliance. The employee would need to show
the employer's representation as to the existence of a plan, the employee's justifiable
reliance on that representation to his or her detriment, the benefit promised, the in-
tended class of beneficiaries, the source of funds, and the benefit claims procedure.
Thus, if a reasonable employee would not rely on the employer's statements or acts, the
Dillingham criteria should not be enough to hold the employer liable for benefits.
In sum, although oral agreements clearly arc enforceable under ERISA, serious
problems may result from such enforcement. Although most courts have adopted the
Dillingham criteria, this standard inadequately protects employees because it fails to state
with certainty when liability attaches under ERISA. Given the serious problems of proof
and the potential liabilities that might accrue to an employer or a fiduciary upon the
finding of an oral agreement, courts should require a stricter standard to protect em-
ployers adequately and to encourage them to provide benefits to employees. Courts
should modify the Dillingham standard to take into account the employee's reliance and
the detriment he or she may have suffered. When these elements are present, an oral
agreement to provide benefits under ERISA should be enforced.
III. CONCLUSION
In enacting ERISA, Congress sought to encourage the growth of benefit plans while
protecting the right of employees to rely on promises of benefits made by their employ-
ers. Prior to the enactment of ERISA, employees had little hope of enforcing their rights
to promised employee benefits. Because Congress may not have anticipated that em-
ployer promises might be unwritten, however, ERISA does not provide uniform stan-
dards to determine if and when an oral agreement would be subject to ERISA.
ER1SA does not state that a plan must be in writing to be subject to the Act. Neither
ERISA's definition nor its coverage sections require that a plan be written to be enforced
under ERISA. The fiduciary provisions, however, contain a writing requirement. The
legislative history treats the writing requirement as part of the discussion of fiduciary
duties. Courts generally interpret the writing requirement as a fiduciary duty, and not
as a bar to enforcement under the Act.
Courts should enforce oral agreements to provide employee benefits under ERISA.
Although the language of the Act is ambiguous, the purpose of the Act is clear. By
design, the Act protects employees' interests in employee benefit plans against infringe-
ment by employers seeking to avoid liabilities. To this extent, the Dillingham court was
correct in enforcing oral agreements to provide benefits. The Dillingham court, however,
did not adequately address the problems that arise from enforcing oral agreements, such
as an employer's need to know with certainty when liability attaches under ERISA.
Enforcement of oral agreements presents numerous difficulties. These difficulties
include problems of proof, the potential for collusion among employees, and potential
liability for the company or the fiduciary. Thus, courts should strengthen the Dillingham
standard to establish clearly when an employer may incur liability for oral agreements.
tea J. CALAMARI &J. I'ERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 445 (2d ed. 1977).
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Courts should enforce only those oral promises that meet both the Dillingham standard
and upon which an employee justifiably relies to his or her detriment. This solution
conforms with Congress's intent to protect an employee's expectation of receiving em-
ployer promised benefits while providing some protection to employers against hidden
liabilities.
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